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threatening its sustainability. This paper’s contribution to the debate is from a political 
economic perspective as it uses data from a Choice Experiment to investigate individual 
preferences for an alternative state pension scheme. Answers are used to estimate a life-cycle 
utility model of preferences towards pensions’ parameters. Results suggest that individuals’ 
value orientation is an important determinant of their preferences. Respondents’ income 
determines which degree of redistribution is preferred. However, preferences according to age 
are in contradiction with what is suggested in theory. 
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1  Introduction 
The implementation of pension systems has been one of the most important achievements 
in terms of social policy in the developed world during the twentieth century. However, 
discussions on the “pension crisis” and the way to reform pension systems have rapidly 
emerged due to demographic and budgetary pressures. Pension reform is nowadays in the 
forefront of the political agenda of many European countries. Still, the reform process is 
slow, despite the urgency required, partially due to political sensitivity. This is partially 
and importantly due to the fact that public pension’s schemes are redistributive.  
The main focus of this paper is to answer the following questions: what are individual 
preferences  over  redistribution  by  state  pension  systems  and  what  determines  these 
preferences? Several studies within the political economy theory field have attempted to 
identify the forces that drive the support for income redistribution and the welfare state. 
Schwarze and Härpfer (2007) summarize these hypotheses into three arguments. The first 
is an efficiency argument which posits that individuals are willing to pay to reduce the 
risk associated with their ex ante income distribution because they may be risk averse. 
The second is the self-interest argument which considers that egoistic pecuniary motives 
are  a  major  determinant  of  individual  preferences.  The  third  argument  relates  to 
inequality aversion. The logic, according to which people would support redistributive 
government policies if they expect to gain from these policies, has been suggested by the 
median voter model (Meltzer and Richard (1981))
2, as well as by the Esping-Andersen 
(1985) as the power resource theory. However, both on the theoretical and empirical 
grounds, the median voter hypothesis has often been questioned (Moene and Wallerstein 
(2003), Kenworthy and McCall (2008)). Indeed, preferences may include the social status 
enjoyed by the individual. Individuals may also be inequality averse. Recently, stated 
preferences techniques have been introduced to analyze preferences for redistribution by 
the  state.  For  instance,  Corneo  and  Grüner  (2002)  find  empirical  evidence  that three 
effects  drive  support  for  redistributive  policies:  the  “homo-oeconomicus”  effect,  the 
“public values effect” and the “social rivalry effect”. On the contrary, Fong (2001) finds 
little evidence that self interest is an important determinant of demand for redistribution, 
in his study social preferences are more important.  
In the field of distributive preferences for pension programs, it has been shown that social 
security is supported  primarily  by  self–interested  desires  on the  part  of  an important 
proportion of citizens. Old age public pensions create self-interested beneficiaries that 
might be against the retrenchment of the welfare state (See Pierson, “Dismantling the 
Welfare State” (1994)). Little empirical studies have conducted to confirm or disconfirm 
this  hypothesis  (apart  from  Lynch  (2006)).  However,  preferences  may  also  be  other-
regarding, referred to  as social preferences.  For example, means-tested  schemes have 
proved to be politically sustainable even if they are concentrated on a small range of 
people. On the empirical side, a strand of the literature has developed recently to analyze 
the preferences and opinion of citizens concerning pensions. See for instance the Special 
Eurobarometer survey on Pension Policy and Pension Reform conducted in 2004. Boeri 
et al. (2001) use stated  preferences contingent valuation methods to analyze attitudes 
                                                 
2  Meltzer  and  Richard  (1981)  and  Iverson  (2005)  posit  that  self-interest  is  a  key  determinant  of  attitudes  towards 
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towards possible pension reforms in Germany, Italy, France and Spain. van Groezen et al. 
(2008) analyze the determinants of people’s preferences for particular kinds of pension 
provision  (public, occupational  and private)  in  15  European countries.  Delaney  et  al. 
(2006),  examine  preferences  for  specific  forms  of  redistribution  in  Ireland: 
unemployment payments, old age pensions and child benefit and find support to the self-
interested  preferences.  See  also  Ferrara  (1993);  Lynch  (2006);  van  Els  et  al.  (2003); 
Devroye (2003), Hamil-Luker (2001). In this study we will utilize a preference survey 
undertaken in Ireland to try to answer these questions. 
Old age pensions are central for the Welfare State in Ireland. On the one hand, they fulfil 
various objectives among which redistribution and poverty alleviation. On the other hand, 
public pension expenditures represent a large share of social public expenditures. Over 
the last decade, several reports (especially governmental) and academic research papers 
aiming at presenting an overview of the Irish pension system and possible alternatives as 
regard  policy  options  for  reform  have  been  published.  Recent  examples  are  the  two 
reports prepared under the aegis of the Pensions Board: the “National Pensions Review 
(2005)” and “Special Savings for Retirement (2006)”; and the “Green Paper on Pensions 
(2007)”. Even though these reports have covered a wide range of issues, people’s opinion 
and  choices  regarding  the  future  of  the  pension  system  have  rarely  been  taken  into 
consideration.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  two  describes  the 
functioning of the Irish pension system, the challenges that threaten its sustainability and 
the debate around pension reform in Ireland. Section three introduces a life cycle utility 
model  for  pension  preferences.  Section  four  presents  the  theoretical  basis  of  discrete 
choice  experiments.  Section  five  outlines  the  preparation  of  the  questionnaire  and 
presents  summary  statistics  for  the  sample.  In  section  six,  we  present  results  from 
different discrete choice models. Finally, in section seven, we discuss future directions of 
research. 
2  The challenges of population ageing and poverty for the Irish pension system 
2.1  Pension provision in Ireland 
The Irish pension system is in many respects typical of the Anglo-Liberal style of welfare 
state, with a relatively insignificant social insurance system, where means testing and 
progressive income taxes are more important. The state pension system has its origins in 
the UK old age assistance act of 1908, with a social insurance pension being introduced 
for  those  70+  in  1961,  with  a  retirement  pension  at  65  introduced  in  1970  (See 
O’Donoghue (2002). The scheme is Beveridgean in focus with more emphasis on poverty 
alleviation  than  on  income  replacement.  Together,  the  public  and  private  pension 
schemes  operating  in  Ireland  (Figure  1)  serve  several  objectives in  different  degrees, 
namely, maintenance of individual standard of living during the period of retirement, 
poverty alleviation and income redistribution. 
   Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Figure 1  
Pillars of the Irish pension system 
 
2.2  The old age social welfare system 
The public pension system - first pillar, public and mandatory - is funded on a Pay As 
You Go (PAYG) basis has three components a State pension – Contributory - available 
from  age  66;  a  State  pension  –  Transition,  available  from  age  65,  but  requiring 
retirement; and, a survivor’s pension. All are flat rate payments that vary slightly based 
upon  contribution  history  but  independent  of  earnings,  with  additional  payments  for 
dependants. These are supplemented by means-tested benefits, financed through taxation 
for those not covered by the insurance system, resulting from significant historical gaps 
in social insurance  coverage. These are nevertheless declining due to the progressive 
extension of coverage since 1974, resulting in the share of pensioners claiming means-
tested payments falling from 45 % in 1994 to 30% in 2004, and expected to reach 14% in 
2017. The current replacement rate for a single pensioner is AAA. 
2.3  The supplementary pension scheme 
The second and third (private and voluntary) pillars are represented by supplementary 
occupational  and/or  individual  pensions:  voluntary  tax  incentivised  private  or 
occupational  system,  which  main  objective  is  to  smooth income over  an  individual’s 
lifetime. Growth in occupational and private pension schemes only accelerated in earnest 
after the Finance Act 1972 which set up a clear legal and fiscal framework for them, but 
has levelled out in recent years. After a period of increasing coverage of occupational 
pensions, ESRI surveys in 1995 found that 52% of the employed workforce was covered 
by occupational schemes, down from 54.4% 1985, but up from 35.6% in 1974. Recent 
Statistical  Office  figures  in  2008  indicate  that  the  percentage  of  employees  with  an 
occupation pension has remained relatively constant fallen to about 52%. The proportion 
of  defined contribution  schemes  has  increased  from  12%  in  1992  (National Pensions 
Board (1993)) to 17% in 1995 (Hughes and Whelan (1996)) to 33% in 2008 (National 
FIRST PILLAR 
State Social Welfare System 
Mandatory and PAYG 
SECOND PILLAR 
Supplementary Pension System 
Voluntary, Funded or PAYG 
Old Age Contributory Pension : 
￿  State Pension (Contributory) 
￿  State Pension (Transition) 
Old Age Non-Contributory Pension 
(Means-Tested). 
Public Service Pension Arrangements 
Occupational Pension Arrangements 
Personal Pensions Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
5 
 
Pensions Board (2008)) of which the majority are in the private sector, where about 50% 
of the pension members are members of DC schemes.  
Personal  pension  arrangements  consist  essentially  of  Retirement  Annuity  Contracts 
(RACs) used by the self-employed and more recently the Personal Retirement Saving 
Accounts  (PRSAs)  introduced  in  2003  to  meet  the  willingness  of  the  government  to 
extend  the  supplementary  coverage.  The  main  problem  related  to  supplementary 
arrangements in Ireland concerns the low coverage (around 50 %), especially among self 
employed. Low contribution rates represent a further inefficiency; they are seen to be 
insufficient to guarantee adequate replacement rates after retirement. It is therefore not 
surprising that the government makes a priority of the necessity to increase incentives 
that would make employers, employees, self-employed and others contribute more into 
private  pension  arrangements  (both  occupational  or  private).  The  government  is  also 
reviewing its incentives policy to be more effective. 
2.4  Poverty among the elderly 
Pensioners in Ireland are a vulnerable group due to being highly dependent on transfers 
payments and having very low labour force participation. In this respect, the National 
Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS) adopted by the government in 1997 to address the problem 
of poverty, and National Action Plan against Poverty and Social Exclusion (NAP/incl), 
identify older people as a particularly vulnerable group to poverty, and both documents 
list a number of targets in relation to income support and service provision for the elderly. 
The average net income for a pensioner unit in 2005 was € 327.55 per week (Green Paper 
(2007)). In 2002, a single pensioner had a replacement rate relative to Gross Average 
Industrial Earnings of 27.2 % if reliant on means tested benefits and 32 % of Gross 
Average Industrial Earnings. While coverage of the insurance scheme is increasing, the 
low replacement rate and lower indexation the level of household earnings growth over 
the boom years saw a rapid rise in elderly poverty; the relative poverty rate of pensioners 
rose from 5.9 % in 1994, to 43.3% in 2000 compared with 16.9% for the working age 
population (DSFA (2002)) and 44.1 % in 2001. Increased indexation of state pensions in 
the past decade has seen a fall in the poverty rate to 14% in 2006, but rose again in 2007 
to 17%.This is high by international standards. In 2005, Ireland had the highest level of 
relative income poverty in the EU among over-65s (OECD (2005)).  
2.5  Population ageing: Key demographic trends 
While  less  serious  than  some  other  EU  countries,  nevertheless,  demographic  ageing 
expected  to  result  in  increasing  the  old  age  dependency  ratios,  which  will  put  fiscal 
pressures on the public finances. Nevertheless, the demographic situation is relatively 
favourable for the next 20 years (Gerald (2004)), especially compared to the situation in 
the other European countries. Ireland still has a young population, and consequently a 
longer period to prepare for the transition from low to high dependency. In the OECD 
countries for instance, the old age dependency ratio is expected to double by 2050, to 
around 40 percent compared to an average 18 per cent in the 1990s (OECD Social Policy 
Studies  (1996)),  whereas  in  Ireland,  it  will  be  rising  from  15  percent  to  36  percent 
(Department of Social and Family Affairs (2006)) 
The  increase  of  the  population  share  of  those  aged  65  and  over  represents  the  main 
pressure  on  the  public  services  as  age-related  public  expenditures  will  have  to  rise. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Pensions are expected to represent the most important part of these increases. Hence, 
much of the debate relating to the pensions public policy in Ireland centres around the 
impact of demographic and economic change on the public finances (DOF (1998)) and 
the  potential  cost  and  funding  arrangements.  Public  spending  on  first  pillar  pensions 
(including public service pensions) is projected to rise from 4.6 % in 2000 to roughly 9-
14%  of  GDP  in  2050  (Natali  (2004)).  Thus  the  country is  faced with both cost  and 
adequacy issues in relation to the pensioner population. Consequently, the combination of 
the poverty risk among the elderly with the challenging demographic pressures calls for 
targeted intervention of the State in the field of pensions.  
2.6  Reforming the Irish pension system 
Because  of  the  concerns  raised  above  about  the  future  increase  in  public  pension 
expenditures,  the  National  Pensions  Reserve  Fund  Act  2000  established  a  national 
pensions  fund  to  help  finance  both  public  pensions  and  public  service  occupational 
pensions. Each year, at least 1 per cent of GNP will be deposited in the fund between 
2001 and 2055. From 2025 the exchequer will be able to draw down monies from the 
fund to finance expenditures on public pensions and on the occupational pensions of 
public sector workers. 
There  have been  a  number of  structure  reforms  over  the  1990’s  and  2000’s  that  has 
resulted in an increase in coverage and since 2001 an increased replacement rate, towards 
a  target  of  34  %  of  average  earnings  set  by  the  National  Pensions  Policy  Initiative 
(NPPI
3). The NPPI also advocated increasing supplementary pension coverage rates with 
a target coverage rate of 70 % and through increasing personal pension accounts through 
setting  legislative  framework  to  put  in  place  to  provide  Personal  Retirement  Saving 
Accounts (PRSAs); However these reforms have been largely parametric, with policy 
relying on incrementalism to move towards a universal pension scheme in time rather 
than a quick move. There seems to be very little public appetite, as manifested in public 
consultation exercises like the Green paper on  pensions in 2007, for major structural 
reforms such as the move to an earnings related state pension or changes in the state 
retirement age. 
The debate has further been developed more recently
4 focusing on improved adequacy, 
the abolition of the retirement requirement at age 65 to allow older people to continue to 
contribute to the economy if they wish to do so, mandatory membership of  PRSAs for all 
workers and a review of the generous tax relief for private pension provision which costs 
a  similar  amount  as  the  social  welfare  pension.  The  Green  Paper  on  Pensions,  2007 
discusses  different  policy  options  including  the  introduction  of  universal  pensions, 
reforming and back-dating the homemaker’s scheme, replacing the average contribution 
test with a total contribution approach and miscellaneous issues relating to social welfare 
pensions including indexing, the existence of two contributory pension schemes, social 
insurance  for  spouses  of  farmers/self  employed.  The  Green  Paper  also  considers  the 
introduction of a mandatory or soft-mandatory supplementary pension scheme.  
                                                 
3 The NPPI has been launched in order to facilitate national debate on how to achieve a developed national policy system 
and to formulate a strategy and make recommendations for actions needed to achieve the system.  
4 See Submission to the National Pensions Board on the Pensions Review, Combat Poverty Agency, September, 2005. Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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Despite  these  reports,  reforming  Ireland’s  pension  system  is  still  a  difficult  task. 
However, it can be made easier by understanding citizens’ opinion concerning the size 
and shape of the welfare state and more generally, by tackling the sources of political 
conflict over the potential directions of reform and the different approaches to address 
sustainability. The different alternatives that can be considered range from maintaining 
the status quo to some option reforms. Note that maintaining the status quo would mean 
that, in the short to medium term, about 47,000 people on average would remain outside 
the Social Welfare pensions system (Green Paper on Pensions (2007)). The other options 
can be divided into enhancing Social Welfare pensions on one hand and encouraging 
greater personal savings through supplementary pensions on the other hand. Reforming 
the  state  pension  system  implies  making  it  more  generous  (through  improving  the 
adequacy of the system) and less means-tested (through extending coverage). This would 
require higher public spending on pensions, and thus higher contribution rates. Shifting 
away  from  the  usual  Anglo-Saxon  type  and  implementing  earnings-related  pension 
benefits can also be considered. The choice experiment aims at evaluating these reform 
options from the citizens’ point of view. 
3  Modelling State Pension System Preferences 
How different variables affect people’s evaluation of the public pension system? Political 
economy  literature  on  the  determination  of  pension  systems’  parameters  models 
individuals’ preferences in an overlapping generation setting, where agents choose the 
values of the parameter(s) through maximizing their utility function over the life cycle. In 
line  with  this  strand  of  the  literature,  we  introduce  a  life-cycle  model  of  pension 
preferences involving a number of choices:  
￿  the level of the contribution rate;  
￿  the size of the pension benefit;  
￿  how benefits are redistributed;  
￿  the eligibility age for the benefit; and  
￿  the  resulting  poverty  rate  among  the  elderly  induced  by  the  pension  system 
chosen.  
We consider a two-periods overlapping generation model. Individuals are successively 
active (18-64  years) then retired (older than 65 years). In addition to age distinction, 
respondents also differ in revenue endowment. For simplicity we assume that the society 
consists of two groups of individuals. An individual of type i is characterized by his 
exogenous income level: i w ,  + - = m m i ;  with  - m for below the median income,  + m for 
above the median income
5. Each individual enters working activity at time 0, retires at 
date 
o l - 1 and  lives until time 1.  We  note 
g
i C  the  discounted  lifetime  income  of the 
respondent of generation g ( o y g , = ) and income group i ( + - = m m i ; ). See Table 1 for a 
definition of the lifetime income of each group. 
The lifetime budget constraint of an old agent is given by: 
( ) ( )










i c b l c c C r r + + = + + =   (1)  
The lifetime budget constraint of the young agents is given by: 
                                                 
5 The annual individual mean income for the sample is €16699 and the annual individual median income is €14000. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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(2)  
o l represents lifetime leisure, it represents the period spend in retirement,  r is a discount 
factor, t is the contribution rate to the state pension scheme, it determines the generosity 
of the system. In order to concentrate on the redistributive feature of the pension system, 
we do not consider explicitly the possibility to redistribute income through another tax. 
o
i c is consumption during old age and 
y
i c is consumption during youth. 
o
i b is the level of 
the state pension benefit for an old individual i. 
Table 1 
Definition of the revenues of the different groups 
Pension benefit  Consumption 
  Below  median 
income 
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m b +  
 
  Below  median 
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i C U . Individuals are assumed to be altruistic, that is, they derive utility not only from 
their own lifetime consumption and leisure but also from the consumption enjoyed by the 
elderly of the opposite income group, and from preferences regarding the poverty rate 
among the elderly. That is, a representative individual votes over the pension benefit they 
would receive from the state pension system, but also on what the current pensioners 
receive. Indeed, individuals are not purely selfish and they might dislike outcomes that 
induce high poverty among the elderly, they are poverty averse (or inter-generationally 
inequality averse). Poverty aversion has an impact on the  “size” of the state pension 
scheme,  that  is,  on  “how  much  is  distributed”.  Furthermore,  they  have  distributional 
preferences over the public pension system (they might be intra-generationally inequality 
averse). Attitudes to inequality have impact on “how pensions are distributed”, that is, 
whether pension benefits are means-tested; universal or earnings-related (see Figure 2).  
The maximization problem of the old generation is given by: 






















c u c c Pov l b C U
o
i
q t g b t a + + + = - + , , , max   (3)  
Similarly, the maximization problem of the young generation is given by: 






















c u c c Pov l b C U
y
i
q t g b t a + + + = - + , , , max
' '   (4)  
+ - = m m k , ,  i k ¹ . 
g
i a   is  the  preference  parameter  associated  with  lifetime 
consumption.  Povis the current poverty rate among the elderly. 
g
i g indicates the effect of Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
9 
 
poverty  aversion.  Individual  feel  poverty  aversion  if  0 <
g
i g . 
g
i q is  the  parameter 
preference for the level of the state pension benefit for the elderly of the other income 
group. ’ refers to the next period variable for the young and the former period variable for 
the old. 
Figure 2  
Degree of redistribution of the state pension system 













Contribution rate Pension benefit
 
   
Usually, income is allocated between consumption and saving through a maximisation 
process  of  the  inter-temporal  utility.  However,  neither  data  on  consumption,  nor  on 
saving are available. Therefore, income, during the first period of life is used as a proxy 
for consumption. We suppose that actual income is equal to disposable income minus 
taxes (apart from contributions to pensions) and saving. We further assumed that only 
public pension benefits compose retirement income. This is a restrictive hypothesis as 
52.9% of respondents from the sample are members of a private scheme.  
The specification above (equations (3) and (4)) implies the estimation of four conditional 
logit models (see Section 6). The estimation process of the utility model allows testing 
empirically hypothesis built up from previous literature on demand for redistribution. The 
question  behind  the  different  hypothesis  is:  what  are  the  forces  behind  people’s 
preferences for redistribution by the public pension system? The estimation of the life 
cycle model allows assessing the explanatory power of three different effects. The first 
hypothesis relates to the income effect, also presented as the “homo economicus effect” 
in Corneo and Grüner (2002). The first argument stipulates that Income is an important 
determinant  in  people’s  evaluation  of  the  public  pension  system  as  respondents  are 
egoistic and will choose the pension alternative that increases their pecuniary gains. The 
second  hypothesis  relates  to  age.  Following  the  assumption  made  by  many  political 
economy  models  in  line  with  the  seminal  work  of  Browning  (1975),  the  age  effect 
suggests that the older the respondent, the more they will choose a higher contribution 
rate to the public pension system. Similarly, pensioners (who benefit the most from the 
state  pension  system)  are  the  more  in  favour  of  maintaining  the  current  system  and 
against the “retrenchment” of the welfare state. Hamil-Luker (2001) analyzes the impact 
of age on public opinion toward government spending on old age assistance and finds 
that age doesn’t have a strong explanatory power. Finally, the value orientation effect 
suggests  that  respondents’  attitudes  towards  redistribution  through  the  state  pension 
system  are  determined  by  their  degree  of  inequality  aversion  which  stipulates  that 
individuals are inequality averse, independently from their economic status (see Bowles 
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Given the hypothesis just mentioned, we are interested in studying how changes in the 
relevant parameters of the model affect the utility of the different groups in society. Table 
2 and Table 3 present some comparative statics properties of the model. The aim is to 
examine how given utilities change in response to changes in parameters of the variables.  
Table 2  
Comparative statics of the attributes of the pension system on individual preferences  
Utility  Pov  + m b   - m b   t   o l  
  First derivatives 
o
m U -  -  +  +  -  + 
o
m U +  -  +  +  -  + 
y
m U -  -  +  +  -  + 
y
m U +  -  +  +  -  + 
Table 3 






























































































































































































































4  Theoretical basis of Discrete Choice Experiments 
The demand for reforming the public Irish pension system is assessed through using and 
extending a particular stated preferences method: choice experiment; conducted to value 
individuals’  preferences  regarding  the  parameters  of  the  Irish  public  pension  system, 
more precisely through estimating preferences for alternative pension systems (means-
tested,  universal  or  earnings-related)  as  a  function  of  the  system  attributes  and 
individuals’ characteristics and attitudes.  
Discrete  CEs  have  widely  been  used  in  the  literature  since  their  introduction  in  the 
marketing  and  transport  fields  by  Louviere  and  Hensher  (1982)  and  Louviere  and 
Woodworth  (1983).  They  have  now been  widely  applied  in  many  areas,  such  as the 
environmental  economics  literature  (Blamey  et  al.  (1999)),  recreation  (Hanley  et  al. 
(2002)), health (Hall et al. (2004)), transport economics and  marketing (See  Hensher 
(1994) and Louviere (1994) for an overview of the use of choice modeling in the field of 
transportation  and  marketing  respectively).  However,  the  use  of  stated  preferences 
techniques  in  the  field  of  pensions  is  still  scarce.  Discrete  choice  experiments  are 
consistent with the Lancasterian microeconomic approach (Lancaster (1966)) whereby 
individuals derive utility from the  attributes of a  good rather than the good itself.  In Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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choice experiments, each respondent is typically presented with several choice sets, each 
containing  a  set  of  alternative  public  goods  -  in  our  case  alternative  public  pension 
systems - defined in terms of their attributes at specified levels. Each alternative being a 
different  combination  of  the  attributes  and  their  levels  constructed  following  a  given 
experimental  design  Respondents  are  then  asked  to  choose  their  most  preferred 
alternative. They are assumed to choose the option that provides them with the highest 
utility value. A baseline alternative (or status quo) is usually included in each choice set. 
Typically,  five  to  eight  choice  sets  are  included  in  a  choice  experiment.  The  choice 
experiment  reported  in  this  paper  contains  alternatives  that  describe  hypothetical, 
constructed potential State pension systems in order to analyze people’s preferences for 
different  kinds  of  public  pension  provisions,  each  implying  a  different  degree  of 
redistribution.  The  hypothetical  scenarios  were  constructed  in  such  a  way  to  be  as 
realistic as possible.  
CE finds its theoretical basis in the random utility model (Thurstone (1927); McFadden 
(1974)), which models choices as a function of attributes and their levels. According to 
the  Random  Utility  Theory  (RUT),  the  indirect  utility  function  that  an  individual  k 
allocates to one alternative i ( ki U ) is decomposed into two parts: a deterministic part ( ki V ) 
which is typically assumed to be linear and additive in the attributes (x) of the A different 
alternatives  in  the  choice  set,  and  a  stochastic  element  (e )  which  represents  the 
unobservable influences on individual choice.  
The  indirect  utility  function  associated  with  alternative  i  for  an  individual  k  can  be 
written: 
( ) ki ki ki ki ki ki x x V U e b e + = + =   (5)  
Where  b represents the vector of preference parameters (coefficients) associated with the 
vector of attribute levels  i x  
The probability that respondent k prefers option i to any option j in the choice set can be 
expressed as  the probability that  the  utility  associated  with  alternative  i  exceeds  that 
associated with all other alternatives: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ki kj kj ki kj ki V V P j i U U P e e - > - = ¹ " >   (6)  
Assuming that the error terms are independently and identically distributed (IID) with an 
extreme-value  (Weibull)  distribution  implies  that  the  probability  of  any  particular 
alternative i being chosen as the most preferred can be expressed in terms of the logistic 
distribution (McFadden (1973)). The following specification is known as a conditional 
logit model: 
( ) ( )











= ¹ " >
 
(7)  
Where m is a scale parameter, inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the error 
distribution.  m is commonly  normalized to one (Ben-Akiva and  Lerman  (1985)). The 
independence of the Weibull error terms across the different options contained in the 
choice  set  implies  that  specification  (3)  obeys  the  Independence  from  Irrelevant Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Alternatives (IIA) property (or Luce’s Choice Axiom; see Luce (1959)) which states that 
the relative probabilities of two options being selected are unaffected by the introduction 
or  removal  of  other  alternatives.  That  is  to  say  that  the  error  terms  are  uncorrelated 
between choices and have the same variance (Carson et al. (1994)). Violations of the IIA 
assumption can be tested using a test developed by Hausman and McFadden (1984). If a 
violation of the IIA hypothesis is observed, then more complex statistical models, that 
relax  some  of  the  assumptions  used,  are  necessary.  Such  models  are  the  random 
parameters logit model (Train (1998)) or the nested logit model (McFadden (1978)). The 
latter allows for correlations among the error terms within classes of alternatives. The 
most  common  method  for  estimating  the  parameters  of  the  model  is  the  maximum 
likelihood. 
Welfare  measures,  and  more  specifically  Willingness  to  Pay  (WTP)  compensating 



























0 V is the utility of the initial state and 
1 V the utility of the alternative state. 
y b represents the marginal utility of income and is the coefficient of the cost attribute. 
The value of a marginal change in any of the attributes can be expressed as the ratio of 
coefficients  given  in  the  estimation  of  (7),  where  c b is  the  coefficient  on  any  of  the 








In order to apply the RUT to our study framework, different attributes have been selected 
to describe the Irish State pension system, these are described in Table 4. 
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Table 4  
Definition of the choice specific attributes 
Attributes Description
lo_pen Weekly State Pension for a low income individual
hi_pen Weekly State Pension for a high income individual
cost Weekly contribution to finance State pensions for the average wage 
pov Poverty rate among the elderly
ret_age Minimum retirement age (years)
The baseline empirical specification is given by the indirect utility (10). Several variants 
will be presented in section 6. 
i i i i ki age ret pov t pen hi pen lo V _ cos _ _ 5 4 3 2 1 b b b b b + + + + =   (10)   
5  Survey Instrument Design and Sample Characteristics 
5.1  Questionnaire and sampling design 
The survey instrument has been developed following several rounds of testing, involving 
one pilot test, individual interviews, discussions with PhD students and one focus group 
composed  of  participants  from  the  general  public.  The  resulting  questionnaire  is 
structured in three parts: Part I: Attitudinal questionnaire; Part II: Choice Experiment; 
and, Part III: Socio-economic questionnaire. The choice experiment aims at investigating 
attitudes  towards  the  current  Irish  state-run pension  system  and  towards  some  of the 
likely  reforms  resulting  from  the  modification  of  the  parameters  of  the  system  and 
involving changes in its principles, degree of redistribution, type of redistribution and 
poverty among the elderly. As shown in Table 5, five attributes have been selected for 
valuation. The first attribute is the weekly state pension benefit for a working individual 
at two third the average earning (low income worker). The second attribute is the weekly 
state pension benefit for a working individual at three times the average earning (high 
income worker). The weekly state pension for a low income individual takes on five 
different levels, among which the first corresponds to the actual state benefit. The levels 
of the weekly state benefit for a high income individual vary accordingly to describe 
either a means-tested, a universal or an earnings-related system. The third attribute is the 
cost one and corresponds to the weekly contribution amount required to finance state 
pension benefits for an average individual worker. The fourth attribute is the poverty rate 
among the elderly implied by each alternative system. Finally, the fifth attribute is the 
earliest retirement age at which individuals are allowed to receive their State pension, 
which  takes  on  two  values,  either  the  current  retirement  age:  65  years  or  a  higher 
retirement  age:  68  years.  The  attributes  have  been  combined  in  eight  choice  sets, 
comprising all the alternatives allowed by the design (32 alternatives). Each choice set 
comprises four alternative choices. A baseline alternative corresponding to the current 
system is included in each choice set. An example of a choice set is given in Appendix 1. 




Description of the attributes and levels 
Attributes
Current situation
Weekly State Pension for 
a low income individual
≤210 210 220 260 180
 Weekly State Pension 
for a high income 
individual
≤210 210, 0, 500 220, 0, 520 260, 0, 620 180, 0, 430
Weekly contribution to 
finance State pensions for 
the average wage 
€30-35 €35-40 €40-45 €45-50 €30-35
€15-20 €15-20 €20-25 €10-15
€50-55  €55-60 €65-70 €45-50
Poverty rate among the 
elderly
Medium (10%-15%) Low (5%-10%) Very low (<5%) Very low (<5%) Medium (10%-15%)
High (15%-20%)  Medium (10%-15%) Very high (20%-25%)
Minimum retirement 
age (years)
65, 68 65, 68 65, 68 65, 68 65, 68
Levels
 
The Sampling strategy was designed so as to obtain a representative sample of the Irish 
population. The questionnaires were administered using door-to-door technique. In most 
of  the  cases,  and  in  accordance  with  respondents’  wishes,  the  questionnaires  were 
dropped off and collected according to an arranged time. The sampling approach for the 
survey followed a two-stage procedure. Sampling was first stratified according to the two 
principle Irish areas classification: Urban/Rural. The second stage involved the choice of 
locations that are representative of the Irish population in terms of age, gender and socio-
economic  status.  The  survey  was  administered  to  a  representative  sample  of  498 
respondents drawn from the adult Irish population entitled to vote (persons aged 18 years 
and over). At the end, 326 questionnaires were ready to analyze. The overall response 
rate of the survey was 65 percent. Table 6 shows the sample age ranges proportions as 
compared to the national proportions. 




Proportions  of  the  different  age  ranges in  the  total  population  (sample  and  national 
proportions) 
Area 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 70 or more Total
Urban
Number of respondents 54 31 36 32 28 19 200
Percentage in the total sample of the same age 
range 78.26 62.00 48.65       58.18 60.87 59.38 61.35 
Rural
Number of respondents 15 19 38 23 18 13 126
Percentage in the total sample of the same age 
range 21.74 38.00 51.35      41.82 39.13 40.63 38.65 
Total
Number of respondents 69 50 74 55 46 32 326
Percentage in the total population sample 21.17 15.34 22.7 16.87 14.11 9.82 100
National proportions in the population aged 
15 years and over (%)  18.75 21.40 26.61 14.00 9.63 9.61 100
National proportions in the total population 
(%) 14.92 17.04 21.18 11.14 7.67 7.65 100
age range
Note: National proportions for the age group 18 to 24 years corespond to the proportions of the age group 15-24.
 
5.2  Descriptive statistics for the sample 
5.2.1  Profile and main characteristics of the survey respondents 
Age is an important variable within the framework of this analysis as pension policy is 
mainly  a  “generational”  issue.  The  age  distribution  of  the  survey  reflects  that  of  the 
gender population, with around 23% in the 35-49 years age range, which is the largest 
percentage of any of the age groups. The majority of respondents are male: 52% against 
and a majority, (47%) attained at least a recognized third level education level. Among 
respondents, 51% are married. 24% of the individuals live in a household composed of 2 
persons, whilst 21% live in a household composed of 4 persons. A majority (27 %) of 
respondents  are  private  sector  employees,  while  17%  are  retired.  For  63%,  the  main 
household income source is employment, which is the largest proportion of all sources of 
income, 11% of respondents belong to a household that relies mainly on public pensions 
for its income and 8% on social welfare. 22% have or have had elderly relatives living in 
their households.  
We expect that pensioners, individuals belonging to a household that derives a large share 
of his income from public pensions, and individuals who have had elderly relatives living 
in their households are more likely to oppose retrenchment of public pensions than those 
who  are  less  dependent  on  welfare  state  programs
6.  This  hypothesis  comes  from 
Pierson’s “new politics of the welfare state” which posits that social transfer programs 
generate  self-interested  beneficiary  groups  who  will  act  politically  to  defend  their 
“programs”. This is particularly true for the retirees as they almost completely rely on 
pensions.  Income  should  have  a  strong  explanatory  power  in  explaining  individuals’ 
choices (In accordance with the Meltzer and Richard model). A majority (28.5%) belong 
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to a household earning between €20000 and €40000 a year before taxes and 22% to a 
household earning between €40000 and €60000 a year.  
5.2.2  Attitudinal profile of the survey sample 
People’s knowledge about the functioning of the pension system seems to be an age issue 
implying that the older the respondent, the more they are informed about how the pension 
system operates and about the level of the pension benefit it provides. While in general, 
very few people are very well informed (17%),  the majority of retirees (+50%) is very 
well informed. This result is also available for people’s knowledge about their (likely) 
retirement income. We expect better informed voters to be more likely to favour reforms 
(See Boeri et al. (2001)).  
41% of respondents are in favour of a higher pension benefit for the poor (equivalent to a 
means-tested system) and 37% are in favour of the same pension benefit for everyone 
(universal system). Only 20% of individuals are in favour of earnings-related pension 
system. Among these, 51% are respondents who belong to the highest income band, this 
same income group is the least in favour of the other systems proposed.  
Respondents were further presented with three options to deal with demographic ageing. 
The solution that seems to be the most popular is increasing the retirement age followed 
by  saving  more  for  retirement.  The  solution  that  is  the  least  popular  is  that  the 
government spends more on pensions. Respondents were also asked how they agree with 
three pension principles. The majority of respondents (36%) strongly disagree with the 
principle that it is an individual responsibility to save for old age. 47% of respondents 
strongly  agree  with  the  fact  that  it  is  the  government  responsibility  to  provide  each 
pensioner with a pension benefit. Finally, 41% of respondents slightly agree that the way 
the  pension  benefit  is  provided  in  Ireland  should  remain  the  same,  and  31%  of 
respondents strongly disagree with this statement. The general idea from this question is 
that the status quo (maintaining the current state pension system) is not the preferred 
option; still a great majority of individuals thinks it is the government responsibility to 
provide each pensioner with a state pension benefit. Concerning the way to pay for the 
pension benefit, a large majority of respondents (66%) choose the option: the richer pay 
proportionally  more  than  the  poorer,  which  suggests  that  respondents  opt  for  a 
progressive contribution system. 
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Table 7  
Attitudinal Profile of the Respondents 
Frequency Percent
Differences in income in Ireland are too large…
strongly agree 135 41.41
slightly agree 108 33.13
strongly disagree 13 3.99
slightly disagree 27 8.28
neither agree nor disagree 21 6.44
Overall, would you be in favour of…
less inequality and more tax 130 39.88
more inequality and less tax 44 13.50
An unchanged amount of taxes and same level of inequality
62 19.02
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the
differences in income…
strongly agree 118 36.20
slightly agree 97 29.75
strongly disagree 42 12.88
slightly disagree 29 8.90
neither agree nor disagree 18 5.52  
Besides specific questions on pensions, we also surveyed general attitudes towards the 
welfare state and demand for redistribution. Concerning income inequality in Ireland, a 
majority (more than 41%) of respondents strongly agree with the statement “differences 
in income in Ireland are too large” (Table 7). A clear majority (39.5%) are in favour of 
less inequality and more tax. A higher proportion of individuals also strongly agree with 
the fact that it is a governmental responsibility to reduce income inequality. 
6  Estimated models and Results  
In  this  section,  we  report  the  conditional  logit  models  used  to  estimate  the  Random 
Utility  Model  (RUM)  constructed  to  assess  preferences  for  alternative  state  pension 
systems. The selected choice specific attributes are used to specify the utility of each 
pension  alternative.  The  models  presented  below  were  estimated  with  STATA  using 
Maximum Likelihood estimation procedures. Several Conditional logit (CL) models have 
been estimated. The first set of models includes only choice specific attributes and the 
second set adds individual specific characteristics.  
6.1  Definition of the Baseline Specifications 
We begin by showing four specifications. The four different variants seem satisfactory 
both on the economic and statistical side. Obviously, the poverty rate among the elderly 
has a strong effect on people’s evaluation of the public pension system.  
In a first attempt, not reported in the table below, we run a Conditional Logit model, with 
only regressors the attributes of choices (see equation (10) above). Results show that the 
estimate of the cost attribute is positive and the estimates of the attributes “level of the 
pension benefit for a low income individual” (henceforth low pension) and “level of the Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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pension benefit for a high income individual” (henceforth high pension) are negative. We 
then  estimate  a  non  linear  utility  function  by  introducing  the  square  values  of  cost, 
poverty, low pension and high pension.  
The utility function retained is defined as follows: 
i
i i i i i i ki
age ret pov pov
t t pen hi pen hi pen lo pen lo V
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  (11) 
Model 1 (CL1) in Table 8 represents the above basic non linear specification. All the 
coefficients are different from zero at the 1 percent significance level with the exception 
of  the  square  value  of  poverty  and  of  the  attribute  retirement  age.  The  signs  of  the 
attributes are as expected. A higher level of the low pension increased the probability that 
a pension scheme alternative would be chosen, as did the high pension but at a much 
lower  magnitude.  Greater  poverty  and  higher  cost  reduced  the  choice  probability  of 
choosing the associated state pension scheme. A retirement age above the existing one 
also decreased the probability of the option being chosen. This last effect is however not 
significant. 
6.1.1  Introducing alternative specific constants 
In  a second model (CL2), we introduce Alternative Specific Constants (ASC’s).  The 
number of the ASCs depends on the number of alternatives in a choice set. As we have 
four alternatives in each choice set, the first alternative being the status-quo, we estimate 
a set of three ASCs. The ASCs show the effect of asymmetric but unobserved factors of 
respondents’ choices (Morrison et al. (2002)). ASCs explain why respondents chose a 
different pension system apart from changes in the attributes that were presented to them 
in the choice experiment.  
The indirect utility associated with choosing alternative i is given by: 
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The parameters associated with the ASCs are positive and significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. Similarly, all variables (apart from the retirement age) are significant 
and of the expected signs. 
A  utility  function  considering  the  alternative  of  choosing  the  status  quo  has  been 
estimated (CL3). A new variable, Alternative0, has been created: 
0 _
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The Alternative Specific Constant is specified to equal 0 when Alternative A, B or C was 
selected and to 1 when the “status quo” option was chosen. The alternative specific to the 
status quo is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level, meaning that 
choosing the current pension scheme decreases utility. 
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Three variables have been created to account for individuals’ choices regarding different 
kinds of financing state pensions implying different kinds of redistribution: means-tested, 
universal  and  earnings-related.  The  model  that  has  been  estimated  is  given  by  the 
following indirect utility function (CL4):  
related earnings universal tested means
age ret pov t pen hi pen lo V i i i i ki
_ _
_ cos _ _
8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1
b b b
b b b b b
+ + +
+ + + + =
  (14) 
Table 8  
Random utility pension choice: Models 1-4 
Actual Choice CL1 CL2 CL3 CL4
State pension benefit  0.136  0.148 0.165 0.013
for a low income individual (6.38)** (4.97)** (7.25)** (3.12)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0003
(-6.08)** (-4.37)** (-6.63)**
State pension benefit  0.012  0.037 0.037 0.003
for a high income individual (5.71)** (5.87)** (5.88)** (1.11)
High-pension-squared -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00003
 (-7.27)** (-7.07)** (-7.08)**
Poverty rate among the elderly -11.078  -17.486 -16.775 -4.254
(-3.88)** (-4.79)** (-5.36)** (-3.28)**
poverty-squared 6.834  8.020 7.535
(0.61) (0.64) (0.67)
Cost for an average  -0.149 -0.459 -0.452 -0.039
worker  (-4.32)** (-5.76)** (-5.67)** (-1.14)
Cost-squared 0.0013  0.002 0.002
(3.60)** (5.70)** (5.59)**
Retirement age -0.016 -0.020 -0.022 -0.041








 (current situation) (-4.18)**
Means-tested pension alternative -0.605
(-1.77)
Universal pension alternative 0.292
(1.44)
Earnings-related pension alternative -1.219
(-2.84)**
log likelihood -3022.21 -3012.12 -3013.40 -3048.10
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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Following CL4, a universal pension scheme increases utility whereas a means-tested or 
an  earnings-related  pension  scheme  reduces  the  probability  of  the  alternative  to  be 
selected.  However  choosing  a  universal  pension  scheme  is  not  significant.  Also, 
introducing these variables reduces the significance of the model as the high pension and 
cost are not significant.  
All four models predict the expected effects of the pension attributes on the utility of 
respondents. The levels of the pension benefits (low and high) increase utility associated 
with  the  alternative.  Cost,  retirement  age  and  poverty decrease  the  probability  of the 
alternative to be chosen. However, what is striking is the strength of the poverty rate in 
reducing utility. This suggests that individuals are highly poverty averse and are in favour 
of a system that leads to the lowest poverty rate among the elderly.  
6.2  Accounting for respondents’ heterogeneity in the choice modelling 
In a further step, we propose four groups of models that allow for taking into account 
respondents’ heterogeneity by introducing differences between individuals into the model 
(Mazzanti  (2003)).  Specifically,  we  estimated  the  impact  of  age,  income,  social 
preferences and value orientation on the assessment of the Irish state pension system.  
There may be several reasons why people surveyed would have a strong preference for 
maintaining the current  public pension scheme or reform it to either a means–tested, 
universal or earnings-related system. The first and most advanced reason, as mentioned 
by the theoretical literature, refers to one’s own pecuniary benefits. Assuming that people 
are rational utility maximizing, they should have the strongest preferences for the system 
that provides them with the highest financial benefit. In this respect, income should have 
important explanatory power. However, pecuniary self-interest has been challenged in the 
empirical  literature  as  not  being  the  main  determinant  of  people’s  preferences  and 
attitudes. Other forces might increase individuals’ utility and thus imply higher demand 
for redistribution. In this respect, several models have been worked out to include other-
regarding motives. For instance, Tabellini (2000) includes altruism from the children to 
their parents to describe social security systems. Age and the degree to which individuals 
benefit  from  public  pensions  are  also  expected  to  explain  differences  in  preferences. 
Finally,  inequality  aversion  and  value  orientations  may  be  important  explanatory 
variables. Van der Heijden et al. (1997) test empirically if altruism and fairness intervene 
in people’s evaluation of public pensions and find strong support that both effects affect 
individuals’ utility.  
6.2.1  Testing for Pecuniary Self-Interest 
In  order  to  test  for  heterogeneity  in  preferences  according  to  income,  two  separate 
conditional  logit  models  are  run  for  two  separate  groups:  those  reporting  an  annual 
individual income above the median annual income of the sample and those reporting an 
annual individual income below the median annual income. Results are given in Table 9. 
The first income group (column 1) contains 157 individuals whereas the second income 
group  (column  2)  contains  169  individuals.  The  third  column  shows  the  results  of 
interactions between individual income and different types of pension provision.  
As in all preceding models, poverty aversion plays a key role in the valuation of the 
public pension system. As it is expected, a higher poverty rate among the elderly reduces Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue 
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utility  of  the  low-income  individuals  much  more  than  the  utility  of  the  high  income 
individuals, its coefficient is however not significant for the high income group. It is 
negative and significant at the 1% level for the low income group. A higher low pension 
benefit increases both the utility of the high income and of the low income group. The 
coefficients  are  positive  and  significant  in  the  two  cases;  however,  the  estimated 
coefficient is higher for the low income group. The estimated coefficients for the high 
pension benefit are also positive and significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient 
is slightly higher for the high income group suggesting that the high pension benefit 
increases utility of the high income group more than of the low income group. These two 
effects give strong support to the self pecuniary argument. The estimated coefficients of 
the cost attribute in both income group models are of the expected sign and significant at 
the 5% level, however a higher contribution rate seems to decrease the utility of the high 
income group more than the utility of the low income group, which is a non expected 
result. This could be explained by the fact that the richest are not willing to pay more to 
have a higher pension benefit and probably count more on private pensions as suggested 
by the summary statistics of the attitudinal questionnaire.  
The third column shows that an earnings-related pension system increases individuals’ 
utility as their income increases. Indeed, the interaction between individual income and 
the earnings-related pension scheme alternative is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. This is a further support for the income effect. Introducing a universal or a means-
tested  pension  scheme  impacts  utility  in  the  opposite  direction:  both  interactions  are 
negative, with the interaction with the means-tested system being significant at the 1 
percent level.  
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Table 9  
Random utility pension choice by income group 
Variable Above median income Below median income Interaction with individual income
State pension benefit  0.132 0.141 0.135
for a low income individual (4.46)** (4.55)** (6.15)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-4.21)** (-4.38)** (-5.93)**
State pension benefit  0.013 0.011 0.009
for a high income individual (4.52)** (3.56)** (3.41)**
High-pension-squared -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(-5.69)** (-4.59)** (-5.64)**
Poverty rate among the elderly -7.543 -15.448 -11.058
(-1.94) (-3.65)** (-3.77)**
poverty-squared -5.585 22.304 7.807
(-0.36) (1.34) (0.68)
Cost for an average  -0.162 -0.136 -0.134
worker (-3.44)* (-2.67)* (-3.38)**
Cost-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.98)* (2.08)* (3.49)**
Retirement age -0.042 0.012 -0.015
(-1.78) (0.48) (-0.88)
Individual income*earnings 0.00001
 related pension system (2.73)**
Individual income*means-tested  -0.00002
pension system (-4.15)**
Individual income*universal  -0.000003
pension system (-1.02)
Log likelihood -1613.24 -1397.56 = -2870.3158
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
6.2.2  Testing for Age Heterogeneity 
Separate  conditional  logit  models  have  been  run  for  two  generations:  the  young 
generation  (younger  than  65  years) and the  old  generation  (over  65  years).  For  each 
generation, two models have been run. The first model is the baseline model and the 
second  one  includes  a  variable  describing  the  current  pension  scheme.  Results  are 
reported in Table 10. Almost all pension attributes are statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all four models. The variable indicating the retirement age was found to be 
statistically insignificant in all models; indeed the attribute retirement age doesn’t seem to 
be an important determinant in people’s preferences for reforming pensions.  
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Table 10  
Random Utility Pension Choice by Generation 
Variable
State pension benefit  0.179 0.181 0.129 0.162
for a low income individual (3.16)** (3.03)** (5.58)** (6.57)**
Low pension-squared -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003
(-3.06)** (-3.01)** (-5.29)** (-5.88)**
State pension benefit  0.022 0.023 0.010 0.041
for a high income individual (3.95)** (1.54) (4.44)** (5.78)**
High-pension-squared -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00004
(-4.13)** (-2.13)* (-6.08)** (-6.84)**
Poverty rate among the elderly -17.181 -17.566 -9.859 -16.755
(-2.34)* (-2.20)* (-3.17)** (-4.91)**
poverty-squared 17.293 17.226 4.668 5.980
(0.60) (0.59) (0.38) (0.49)
Cost for an average  -0.295 -0.316 -0.119 -0.484
worker (-3.34)** (-1.65) (-3.18)** (-5.51)**
Cost-squared 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(2.32)* (1.88) (2.84)** (5.33)**
Retirement age -0.008 -0.009 -0.017 -0.025
(-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.93) (-1.34)
Current pension system -0.065 -1.091
(-0.12) (-4.54)**
Log likelihood -480.31  -480.31  -2533.87 -2523.46
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
Older than 65 years Younger than 65 years
 
When including the status quo alternative in the estimation, the variables “low pension” 
and “cost” become insignificant for the old group, these variables remain however highly 
significant  and  of  the  expected  sign  for  the  young  group.  In  all  cases,  a  higher  low 
pension benefit increases the probability of the alternative to be chosen. In fact, estimated 
coefficients for the low pension are significant at the 1% level for both generations and 
higher for the old generation. the older the respondent, the more they are in favour of an 
expansion of the state pension system. Poverty rate among the elderly is negative and 
significant  at the  5%  level  for  the  old  generation  and  at  the  1% level for  the  young 
generation.  When  not  including  the  current  pension  system  in  the  utility  function,  a 
higher poverty rate decreases the probability of the alternative being chosen at a much 
higher  degree  for the  old  generation  than  for  the  young  generation. Similarly,  in the 
baseline model, cost decreases the utility of the old generation more than the utility of the 
young generation. This result is however inversed once we include the “current situation” 
variable,  furthermore  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  cost  attribute  is  no  longer 
significant for the old generation. This latter result is in contradiction with the theoretical 
priors as we would have expected retirees to be in favour of a higher contribution rate as 
they  don’t  contribute  to  the  system  anymore  and  are  net  beneficiaries.  Finally,  the 
estimated coefficient for the variable “current system” is negative but not significant for 
the old generation. It is negative and significant at the 1% level for the young generation 
suggesting  that  the  younger  prefer  departing  from  the  current  state  pension  scheme. 
Maintaining the current pension system decreases the utility of the old generation less 
than the utility of the young generation. However, from theoretical findings, we would Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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expect the current pension system alternative to have a positive effect on the utility of the 
pensioners and they gain from this system.  
6.2.3  Testing for Age and Income Heterogeneity in Evaluating the Public Pension 
System 
Table 11 reports the estimation results for four separate groups: old and low income, old 
and high income, young and low income and young and high income agents. 
The estimated coefficients for the high income-old generation are all of the expected sign, 
but only three variables: the high pension benefit, its squared value  and the cost  are 
significant at the 1% level. Poverty rate is significant at the 5% level. The estimated 
coefficients for the low income-old generation are also all of the expected sign, apart 
from the retirement age which is positive. The low pension benefit and its squared value 
are  significant  at  the  1%  level.  The  high  pension  benefit  and  its  squared  value  are 
significant at the 5% level. All the other estimates are not significant. The estimated 
coefficients for the high income-young generation are of the expected sign. However 
poverty rate, its squared value and the retirement age are not significant. Finally, the 
estimated coefficients for the low income-young generation are all of the expected sign 
apart from the retirement age which is positive. All the variables are significant apart 
from the squared value of poverty, the squared value of cost and the retirement age.  
The estimated coefficient of the low pension benefit is the lowest for the low income-
young generation which is surprising as we expect it to be the lowest for the high income-
young generation. However, it is the highest for the low income-old generation, which is 
as expected. The estimated coefficient for the high pension benefit is also the lowest for 
the low-income-young group. Poverty aversion is the highest among the high income-old 
generation,  followed  by  the  low  income-young  generation,  suggesting  that  poverty 
aversion  is  still  a  crucial  element  in  the  evaluation  of  the  pension  system.  Poverty 
aversion  is  thus  independent  from  age  and  income.  Cost  aversion  is  also  the  highest 
among  the  high  income-old  generation.  This  is  also  not  expected.  Indeed,  the  older 
should be the more in favour of increasing contribution rates to the public pension system 
as they are not any more in the tax system; similarly, we expect a higher contribution to 
decrease the utility of the low income individuals more than the utility of the high income 
individuals. 
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Table 11  
Estimation Results for Four Groups Differentiated by Age and Income 
Variable over 65 years & over 65 years & Below 65 years & Below 65 years &
above median income below median income above median income below median income
State pension benefit for  0.138 0.242 0.132 0.126
a low income individual (1.85) (2.73)** (4.07)** (3.80)**
Low pension-squared -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002
(-1.80) (-2.62)** (-3.79)** (-3.67)**
State pension benefit for 0.023 0.019 0.011 0.010
a high income individual (3.14)** (2.20)* (3.44)** (2.84)**
High-pension-squared -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001
(-3.05)** (-2.45)* (-4.67)** (-3.86)**
Poverty rate among  -22.741 -6.006 -4.098 -16.667
the elderly (-2.32)* (-0.51) (-0.95) (-3.65)**
poverty-squared 36.524 -27.450 -16.023 28.869
(0.97) (-0.55) (-0.94) (1.62)
Cost for an average  -0.322 -0.221 -0.118 -0.118
worker (-2.80)** (-1.54) (-2.25)* (-2.15)*
Cost-squared 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.83) (1.05) (2.12)* (1.75)
Retirement age -0.051 0.043 -0.040 0.006
(-0.87) (0.66) (-1.55) (0.26)
log likelihood -262.91 -212.40 -1340.08  -1180.32
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%  
6.2.4  Testing for value orientation 
Apart  from  the  two  most  commonly  advanced  reasons  (age  and  income)  to  explain 
people’s heterogeneity in evaluating pensions, people’s utility may be affected differently 
because of value judgments about equality and social justice in general and regarding the 
objectives and principles of a pension system in particular.  
Table  12  reports  regression  results  introducing  interactions  between  attitudinal 
characteristics of the respondents and choice specific attributes for the whole sample. The 
estimate coefficients for the choice specific attributes are all significant at the 1 percent 
level  and  of  the  expected  sign.  Almost  all  interactions  are  of  the  expected  sign. 
Interactions displaying significant parameters at the 1 percent level suggest that people’s 
attitudes regarding the role of the state in the income redistribution and their opinion 
about the principles of the pension system are important determinants in their evaluation 
of the state pension scheme.  
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Table 12  
Estimated Results for Attitudinal Interactions 
Variable
State pension benefit for a  0.399 More inequality and less tax*cost -0.038
low income individual (8.17)** (-2.06)*
Low pension-squared -0.001 Less inequality and more tax 0.615
(-7.30)** *poverty rate (0.32)
State pension benefit for a  0.021 Income difference in Ireland  0.0001
high income individual (1.78) are too large*low pension (0.06)
High-pension-squared -0.00006 Everyone pays proportionally  -0.008
(-5.09)** the same*low pension (-2.10)*
Poverty rate among the elderly -485.977 Everyone pays proportionally  0.001
(-8.22)** the same*high pension (4.02)**
poverty-squared 506.097 Everyone pays proportionally  1.573
(6.74)** the same*poverty rate (0.86)
Cost for an average worker -3.942 The poor receive a higher 0.017
(-6.03)**  pension benefit*low pension (6.05)**
Cost-squared 0.008 The poor receive a higher  -0.001
(3.62)** pension benefit*high pension (-4.64)**
Retirement age -0.216 Pensionproportional to   earnings 0.0004
(-3.71)**  before retirement*high pension (0.93)
Benefit for a high income  -0.481 Everyone has the same  -8.178
individual*poverty (-6.57)** pension benefit*poverty rate (-6.64)**
Poverty rate among the  10.905 State responsability to reduce  0.009
elderly*cost (6.47)** inequality*high pension (7.17)**
Benefit for a low income 0.011 State responsability to reduce -0.117
 individual*cost (5.83)**  inequality*cost (-7.41)**
Poverty rate*retirement age 1.276 Individual responsibility to save 0.001
(2.65)**  for its old age*high pension (2.95)**
Benfit for a high income  0.0004 State responsibility to provide pensioners 0.014
individual*retirement age (3.21)**  with a pension benefit*low pension (4.80)**
People will have to work longer 0.015
*retirement age (0.39)
The state will have to spend  0.0008
more on pensions*low pension (0.22)
The state will have to spend  0.005
more on pensions*high pension (2.40)*
People will have to work  -0.014
longer*cost (-2.91)**
The state will have to spend -0.072
 more on pensions*cost (-2.26)*
The state will have to spend  -2.204
more on pensions*poverty rate (-0.76)
Less inequality and more tax 0.001
*low pension (0.47)
More inequality and less tax 0.005
*high pension (3.40)**
Less inequality and  0.016
more tax*cost (2.73)** Log likelihood  -1887.24
Value of z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
Total sample
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7  Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the different forces that can affect people’s evaluation of the 
state pension system. Data used to estimate individuals’ well-being come from a choice 
experiment  conducted  in  Ireland  in  2008.  Respondents  were  presented  with  several 
choice sets, each containing four alternatives from which they had to choose one. Each 
alternative  has  different  implications  for  the  extent  of  intra-generational  and  inter-
generational  redistribution.  In  general,  within  the  political  economy  literature  about 
demand for redistribution though social security, it is assumed that individuals’ utility is 
determined  by  their  self-interest.  In  this  respect,  individuals’  own  characteristics  as 
income and age play a significant role. Nevertheless, other forces, as altruism and social 
preferences,  may  also  explain  people’s  demand  for  redistribution.  In  this  respect, 
estimation  results  have  shown  that  poverty  and  inequality  aversion  indeed  affect 
individuals’ utility and their demand for redistribution. All individuals, regardless of age 
and income are poverty averse and a higher poverty among the elderly decreases utility at 
an important degree. When the evaluation of the levels of pension benefits depends on 
age and income of respondents, cost and poverty are independent.  
Results induced by interactions between individual-specific characteristics and choice-
specific  attributes  confirm  how  people’s  demand  for  redistribution  through  the  state 
pension scheme is also driven by their perception of inequality, poverty, redistribution 
and their value orientation concerning pensions. Several other models not reported have 
also been estimated to test for heterogeneity in preferences. Notably, interacting political 
variables with the choice specific attributes has shown that the level of social contract as 
well as party partisanship partly explains individuals’ heterogeneity in their preferences 
for different kinds of state pension systems.  
One  next  objective  of  the  study  is  to  derive  implicit  prices  for  the  pension-specific 
selected  attributes  and  to  investigate  individuals’  preferences  heterogeneity  in 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for pension reforms. Individual preferences will be aggregated 
through a majority voting mechanism that handles multidimensional policy issue space 
(probabilistic  voting  model)  in  order  to  determine  pension  policy  that  will  be 
implemented at the national level. Finally, it will be interesting to use the aggregated data 
from  the  choice  experiment  within  a  micro-simulation  framework  to  account  for  the 
impact population ageing on the shape of the public pension system. Eliciting Individual Preferences for Potential Reforms of the Irish State Pension System 
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8  Appendix 
Appendix 1 : Example of a choice set 
Policy option 









1.  Weekly  State  Pension  for  a  low  income 
individual 
≤ €210  €210  €180  €220 
2.  Weekly  State  Pension  for  a  high  income 
individual  
≤ €210  €210  €180  €0 
3. Weekly contribution to finance State pensions 
for the average wage  
€30   €35  €35   €40  €30   €35  €15   €20 
4. Poverty rate among the elderly. 
Medium  
(10%   
15%) 
Low 





(10%   
15%) 
5. Minimum retirement age   65  65  65  68 
Please Tick your preferred option             
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